

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

84 3230276

SCR

PAGE 001

NC 3230276

TOR: 281712Z JAN 84

RR RUEAIE  
ZNY CCCCC ZOC STATE ZZH  
UTS7350  
RR RUEHC RUEHDD  
DE RUEHLD #2156/01 0272147  
ZNY CCCCC ZZH  
R 211958Z JAN 84  
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON  
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2748  
INFO RUEHDD/NATO COLLECTIVE  
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ LONDON 02156

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: NATO, MNJC, MCP, INF  
SUBJECT: CODEL LANTOS MEETING WITH NEIL KINNOCK

REF: LONDON 1972

1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.  
2. SUMMARY: CODEL LANTOS MET IN LONDON JANUARY 23  
WITH LABOR LEADER NEIL KINNOCK. HIGHLIGHTS INCLUDED  
KINNOCK'S FORTHRIGHT REITERATION OF LABOR'S POLICY  
OF UNILATERAL NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT. CODEL MEETINGS  
WITH FCO MINISTER OF STATE BARONESS YOUNG, MOD MINISTER  
OF STATE JOHN STANLEY, AND NATO SYG-DESIGNATE CARRINGTON  
ARE REPORTED SEPTELS. END SUMMARY

25X1

3. LABOR'S NUCLEAR UNILATERALISM  
-----

THE MEETING WITH NEIL KINNOCK BEGAN WITH KINNOCK'S  
DISCUSSION OF SUPPOSED ANTI-AMERICANISM IN BRITAIN  
AND IN THE LABOR PARTY. THE MOOD, HE SAID, WAS NOT  
IN FACT ANTI-AMERICAN, BUT RATHER ANTI-REAGAN. IT  
GREW OUT OF WHAT WAS PERCEIVED IN BRITAIN TO BE THE  
WORLD VIEW OF THIS AMERICAN ADMINISTRATION. IT WAS NOT  
ONLY A DISAGREEMENT ON SUBSTANCE IN AREAS LIKE THE  
CARIBBEAN AND CENTRAL AMERICA, BUT ALSO A QUESTION OF  
STYLE.

4. A PARTICULAR POINT OF BRITISH AND LABOR PARTY  
SENSITIVITY WAS DEFENSE, SPECIFICALLY CRUISE MISSILE  
DEPLOYMENT. THOSE WEAPONS WOULD NOT BE UNDER BRITISH  
CONTROL, AND WERE OBJECTIONABLE IN THEMSELVES AS FIRST-  
USE WEAPONS. MOREOVER, THEY SHARED THE DISABILITY OF ALL  
NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN BRINGING DISASTER ON ATTACKER AS  
WELL AS ATTACKED. HE COULD NOT IMAGINE A BRITISH  
LEADER ACTUALLY PRESSING THE NUCLEAR BUTTON, GIVEN THE  
CONSEQUENCES WHICH WOULD ENSUE. INDEED, GIVEN THE  
IMPOSSIBILITY OF THEIR USE, NUCLEAR WEAPONS COULD NOT  
EVEN BE USED TO "MENACE" AN OPPONENT. THEY'RE QUITE  
SIMPLY USELESS. HENCE, LABOR WAS COMMITTED TO A POLICY  
OF UNILATERAL NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT FOR BRITAIN AND WOULD

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

**CONFIDENTIAL**

84 3230276 SCR

PAGE 002  
TOR: 281712Z JAN 84

NC 3230276

REMAIN SO COMMITTED.

5. THERE WAS ALSO THE ISSUE OF THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION'S APPROACH TO CONSULTATION. FROM LABOR'S PERSPECTIVE THE ADMINISTRATION'S APPROACH MEANT THAT BRITAIN DID NOT EVEN HAVE THE STATUS OF A "JUNIOR PARTNER" IN THE ATLANTIC RELATIONSHIP. AT THE SAME TIME, HOWEVER MUCH LABOR AND OTHERS MIGHT CRITICIZE RECENT AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY ATTITUDES, THERE WERE NO CRITICISMS OF AMERICAN INSTITUTIONS OR THE AMERICAN PEOPLE. THERE HAD BEEN, WAS, AND WOULD BE A STRONG RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES. STILL, THE CRITICISM OF AMERICAN ATTITUDES WOULD BECOME MORE HEATED IF "REAGANISM" BECAME MORE EXTREME.

6. KINNOCK ADDED THAT HE WANTED TO EMPHASIZE AS WELL THE GOOD ELEMENTS OF THE RELATIONSHIP. FOR EXAMPLE, THERE WAS A MUCH HEALTHIER RELATIONSHIP NOW THAN THERE HAD BEEN IN THE MID-SEVENTIES BETWEEN THE LABOR PARTY LEADERSHIP AND THE LONDON EMBASSY. THIS WAS A VERY POSITIVE ELEMENT. MOREOVER, WITH THE PASSAGE OF THE CURRENT ADMINISTRATION, ATTITUDES TOWARD AMERICA WERE LIKELY TO RETURN TO THE MORE FAVORABLE NORM OF THE POST-WAR ERA.

7. CONGRESSMAN LANTOS SAID THAT THE PRESENTATION KINNOCK HAD MADE WAS SIMILAR TO WHAT THE SOVIETS WERE SAYING, I.E., THAT THEY WERE NOT AGAINST THE PEOPLE OF AMERICA BUT JUST AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT. AMONG DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENTS IT WAS NOT VALID TO SEPARATE THE REGIME FROM THE ELECTORATE IN THIS WAY; THAT KINNOCK HAD DONE SO WAS MORE DISTURBING THAN HE MIGHT REALIZE.

8. KINNOCK SAID THAT HE DID NOT WANT TO DRAW AN EQUATION BETWEEN THE SOVIETS AND THE UNITED STATES. BUT BOTH WERE SUPERPOWERS; BOTH WERE DEPLOYING THEIR ARMAMENTS ON THE EUROPEAN CONTINENT; BOTH EXERCISE A DEGREE OF AUTHORITY OVER THE AFFAIRS OF THEIR ALLIES.

9. RESPONDING TO A QUESTION ON HOW LABOR WOULD PROPOSE TO APPROACH THE DEFENSE ISSUE IF IT WERE TO ASSUME POWER, KINNOCK SAID THERE WERE SEVERAL POSSIBILITIES: ONE WAS THE DEVELOPMENT OF CONVENTIONAL STRENGTH. ANOTHER WAS A CHANGE IN THE RATIO BETWEEN "OFFENSIVE" AND "DEFENSIVE" WEAPONRY. FOR EXAMPLE, A LABOR GOVERNMENT MIGHT REVERSE THE RATIO OF INTERCEPTOR TO ATTACK AIRCRAFT IN BRITISH INVENTORIES. THERE WOULD

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: NATO, MNUC, MCP, INF  
SUBJECT: CODEL LANTOS MEETING WITH NEIL KINNOCK

ALSO BE MORE EMPHASIS ON DEFENSE TECHNOLOGY, FOR EXAMPLE IN THE AREA OF LAND AND SEA MINES, ANTI-TANK WEAPONS AND OTHER HIGH TECHNOLOGY DEFENSE WEAPONS. LABOR WOULD ALSO WORK FOR THE NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT OF THE SUPERPOWERS.

10. IN RESPONSE TO CONGRESSMAN VANDER JAGT'S ACCUSATION THAT LABOR'S CRITICISMS WERE ONE-SIDED, KINNOCK RESPONDED THAT IT WAS NATURAL TO FOCUS ON A COUNTRY WITH WHICH YOU WERE ALLIED. MOREOVER, LABOR STATEMENTS ON DEFENSE AND FOREIGN POLICY WERE NOT ALL THAT ONE-SIDED. FOR EXAMPLE, LABOR PROTESTED STRONGLY AGAINST THE SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN. THOSE PROTESTS DID NOT, HOWEVER, RECEIVE MUCH PUBLICITY.

11. THE CONGRESSMEN ASKED WHETHER ABANDONMENT OF NATO'S DOCTRINE OF NUCLEAR-FIRST USE WOULD MAKE THE ALLIANCE'S

**CONFIDENTIAL**

**CONFIDENTIAL**

84 3230276

SCR

PAGE 003

NC 3230276

TOR: 281712Z JAN 84

NUCLEAR STRATEGY MORE ACCEPTABLE TO LABOR. KINNOCK SAID IT WOULD BE A MOVE IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION. BUT LABOR WOULD RID BRITAIN OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, BOTH BRITISH NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND AMERICAN. AT THE SAME TIME, A LABOR-LED BRITAIN WOULD STAY IN NATO.

12. REFLECTING ON SOVIET FOREIGN AND DEFENSE STRATEGIES, KINNOCK SAID THAT THE SOVIETS WERE FACED WITH REAL PROBLEMS BECAUSE OF STAGNATION IN THEIR ECONOMY AND IN POLITICAL DECISION-MAKING. HOWEVER, HE WAS CONVINCED THAT THE SOVIETS HAD NO INTEREST IN DOMINATION OF WESTERN EUROPE AND WERE NOT LIKELY TO MAKE ANY MILITARY MOVE TOWARD THAT GOAL. MOREOVER, THEY WOULD NOT FIND IT POSSIBLE TO DOMINATE THE INDEPENDENT DEMOCRACIES OF WESTERN EUROPE. "EFFNLANDIZATION" WAS NOT A REAL ISSUE. FOR ONE THING, FINLAND WAS IN FACT A THRIVING DEMOCRACY. AND THERE WAS A DIFFERENCE IN SCALE BETWEEN A SMALL SCANDINAVIAN COUNTRY AND THE WHOLE OF DEMOCRATIC WESTERN EUROPE.

13. RESPONDING TO A QUESTION WHETHER HE AGREED WITH THOSE COMMENTATORS WHO THOUGHT THAT BRITISH ABANDONMENT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS WOULD GIVE A MORAL UPLIFT TO THE NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT MOVEMENT WORLDWIDE, KINNOCK SAID HE DID NOT FOOL HIMSELF THAT A BRITISH MOVE WOULD HAVE SUCH AN IMPACT. THE BRITISH PARTY SAW THE SITUATION IN BRITISH TERMS. NOR DID KINNOCK OVERESTIMATE SOVIET GOODWILL IN DISARMAMENT NEGOTIATIONS. HE HAD TOLD THE SOVIETS OF HIS DISAPPOINTMENT OF THEIR WALKOUT IN GENEVA. AT THE SAME TIME HE SHARED WITH DENIS HEALEY THE PERCEPTION THAT THE TALKS HAD NOT BEEN GETTING ANYWHERE IN ANY CASE.

14. KINNOCK WAS ASKED WHAT THE FUTURE LABOR GOVERNMENT'S ATTITUDE WOULD BE TOWARD ISRAEL. HE SAID THAT LABOR RECOGNIZED THE REQUIREMENT OF ISRAEL FOR SAFETY AND SECURITY ON ITS BORDERS. BUT HE COULD SEE NO SENSE IN ISRAEL'S POLICY OF CREATING SECURITY BY THE THREAT OF COUNTER-ANNIHILATION. WE HAD TO ASK OURSELVES ABOUT OUR WILLINGNESS TO SUPPORT A POLICY OF BALANCE OF TERROR IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

15. THIS CABLE WAS NOT SEEN BY CODEL LANTOS BEFORE THEIR DEPARTURE. PRICE

END OF MESSAGE

CONFIDENTIAL

**CONFIDENTIAL**